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The Growth and Composition of the 
U.S. Labor Force 
In sharp contrast with the experiences of all other indus- 
trialized nations, the size of the labor force of the United 
States is growing rapidly while, simultaneously, its age, 
gender, and ethnic composition are changing markedly. 
Consequently, human resource issues present an unprece- 
dented challenge in the nation's quest to achieve a fully 
employed and equitable society. New public policies that 
focus on labor market adjustment policies will be re- 
quired if these developments are to be a boon rather than 
a bane to the emerging postindustrial economy. 
"human 
F ALL THE EXPLANATIONS FOR ECONOMIC I'KOGRESS BY 
industrialized nations during the last half of the 20th 
centu?, the most insightful has been the recognition of 
resources as the wealth of nations" ( I ) .  Cou~ltries with 
limited physical resources, such as Japan a i d  West Germany, have 
sustained superior ecoilomic performances in this new competitive 
era largely because they have been forced, by lack of alternatives, t o  
focus national economic policy on  human resource issues. 
One approach t o  the study of human resources is the quantitative 
perspective. It examines the effects that population trends and 
characteristics have on the size and composition of the civilian labor 
force that is available for e~liployment. Another is the qualitative 
vantage point. It involves issues pertaming to the actual preparation 
of the available labor supply for employment. 111 the contemporary 
era of rapid technological change and enhanced international com- 
petition, all industrialized tlatiorls n u s t  address qualirative issues. 
But no other nation in the 1980s is simulta~~eouslv confronted with 
a labor force that is gro\\'iilg as fast arid whose conlposition is 
changing as rapidly as is that of the United States. Constancy of size 
and homogeneity of composition are convenient labor t ime as- 
sumptions of standard ecorrolllic theory. Neither proposition, how- 
ever, is an operational concept for understanding the currel~t 
challenges to  labor market adjustment and public policy formulation 
in the United States. 
The author u a pn~ks so r  at the New York St,~tc School of Industrial and Laboi 
Keiatior~s at Coriieli L'nl\crsln, Ithacn. Nl i  14851. 
The Relation of Population to Labor Force 
Changes 
A nation acquires its population in two ways: people are native 
born within its boundaries or foreign-born people immigrate for 
permanent o r  temporary settlement, Alterations in the size and 
characteristics of the population, in turn, are transmitted to  the 
economy through labor force participation. 
Analysis of the size of the native-born population that may be 
available for employment over time is a relatively straightforward 
process. The available statistics pertaining to their potential number 
and their characteristics are reasonablv predictable. Accounting for 
the foreign-born portion of the population, however, has proved to 
be a more dificult task. Oficial figures on  the foreign born are only 
available every 1 0  years as a product of the decennial cetlsus, but 
immigration to the United States is a continuous daily process. 
I~nn~igration accounted for at least one-third of the annual 
growth rate of the U.S. population (and probably a higher percent- 
age of the labor force) in the 1980s. It is anticipated that the 
percentage will increase in the 1990s. Despite the complex and 
highly legalistic nature of  the nation's immigration and refugee 
adllission systems, substantial illegal immigration has circumvented 
these formal procedures. Measuring the size and flow of illegal 
immigrants has been a frustrating process (2).  Obviously, there are 
no oficial data series. Only admitlistrative data on actual apprehen- 
sions by the U.S. Imniigration and Naturalization Service are 
available. These numbers have soared t o  record heights in the mid- 
1980s---totaling more than 1.2 million apprehensions in 1986. But 
apprehension statistics include multiple countings of the same 
people so they cannot be used to measure the actual number of 
individuals involved. On the other hand, it is commonly acknowl- 
edged that the vast majority of illegal immigrants are never appre- 
hended-especially those who overstay their visas and who mostly 
conne from nations other than Mexico. Yet even most Mexicans, 
who ~lsually cross the border without a visa and who are believed to 
account for about one-half of the ailnual flow of illegal inimigrants, 
eventually get into the United States through sheer repetition of 
entry etforts. 
Inmligration f l o w  are also less predictable because immigration 
policy in the United States is set on  purely political criteria. The 
economic in~plications of various administrative decisio~ls, judicial 
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rulings, and legislative changes that shape the size and composition being unemployed. The unemployed are those persons in the 
of immigration flows are seldom the subject of careful research. noninstitutionalized population who are 16 vears of age or older 
Thus, the employment consequences of immigration and refugee 
policies cannot be adequately anticipated. The recently enacted 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, for instance, 
contains four different amnesty programs that will allow millions of 
illegal immigrants and others whose admission legal it!^ was previ- 
ously in question to adjust their status to become permanent 
resident aliens. If they choose, all may eventually become naturalized 
citizens. In some cases, the amnesty beneficiaries \vill be able to have 
their inunediate relatives (spouses, children, and parents) join them 
at once. All will be able to reunify their families eventually. The new 
law also greatly liberalized the provisions that allow foreign tempo- 
rary workers to be employed in the future in the United States. 
Hence, no one knows what the ultimate population and employ- 
ment effects of this historic legislation will be other than to say that 
millions of people will be in\lolved over the next 10 years. 
With regard to both the native-born and the foreign-born popula- 
tion, there is, of course, some annual emigration. Since 1958, 
who do not work and who are willing, able, airailable, and "actively 
seeking" work. 
The civilian labor force, however, does not include those persons 
who want to work but who, because of the state of the economy, 
have abandoned active search for a job because they believe such 
efforts would be fruitless. Such potential labor force participants are 
called "discouraged workers." Kesearch has shown that the more 
people who are unemployed at any given time, the more who tend 
to be discouraged (and vice versa). It also reveals that womcn in 
general as well as younger and older men are most likely to be 
affected by this phenomenon. 
With the high aggregate unemployment levels of the mid-1980s, 
the number of discouraged workers has held at the high level of 
about 1.2 million persons over the past 3 years. Because they are not 
actively seeking a job, discouraged workers are not officially counted 
as being unemployed and, therefore, are excluded from being 
counted in the civilian labor force. 
however, the federal government has ceased~collecting such data. On the other hand, the definition of the civilian labor force does 
Experience has demonstrated that most emigrants are reluctant to include as being employed all persons who desire to work full time 
officially give up their U.S. citizenship or permanent resident alien but who can only find part-time jobs because of prevailing economic 
status. These emigrants fear that they may change their minds and conditions. In the first quarter of 1987, the involuntarily part-time 
e\lentually decide to come back. Unlike most other nations, the employed work force totaled 5.4 million workers. 
United States does riot have a passport control program for people Thus, the official definition of the civilian labor force has limita- 
leaving the county. Hence, when sketchy information on emigra- tions. Therefore, the definition of who should be included and who 
tion was collected, it was deemed too unreliable to be of any should not is, periodically, a heated subject of both political and 
analytical value. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine net professional controversy (3). 
immigration flow. There is no doubt, however, that immigration 
exceeds emigration i11 the 1980s bv several multi~les. 
As for thg behavioral link beme'en the populaton and the labor 
force, it too has been difficult to anticipate. Actual labor force The Unique Experience of the United States 
participation rates of subgroups of the populatio~l vary at given Since the mid-1970s, the civilian labor force of the United States 
points in time and are sensitive over time to changing unemploy- has been growing at a sustained pace of about 2.2 million net 
ment rates, inflation rates, fertility rates, family practices, and social additional job seekers a year (from 93 million in 1975 to 117.8 
attitudes. Thus, the wise aphorism-attributed to the physicist Niels million in 1986). In terms of those acL. illy able to find employ- 
Bohr-that "it is hard to predict, especially the future" applies to the ment, their numbers also have increased significantly from 85.8 
art of forecasting actual labor force size or behavior. million to 109.5 million over this same time man. This nrowth in 
- U 
absolute numbers is not found in con~parisons with any of the other 
major industrial powers of the free world (Table 1). Onlv Canada 
Labor Force Definition and Japan have shown any appreciable absolute increases i;l the size 
of their respective labor forces over this ~ e r i o d .  In West Germanv 
As with all economic nieasures, the civilian labor force has a and Great Britain the number of employed persons was actually 
particular statistical definition. The civilian labor force is conlposed smaller in 1985 than it was in 1975 (that is, they have sustained 
of all persons in the noninstitutionalized population over 16 years of negative growth in employment and soaring unemployment). For 
age who have a job plus those who meet a specific definition as France, Italy, and the Netherlands, employment changes have been 
Table 1. Civilian labor force, employment, and ilnemploymcnt for ten countries, in 1975 and 1985. Data for Canada, Australia, Japan, and the European 
countries have been adjusted to approximate U.S. labor force definitions. Numbers in thousands; unemployment rates in percentages (11). 
Employment 
status and United Canada Australla Japan Erancc M'e\t Great Italy Nethcr- States Germanv Krlta~n lallds S~vcden year 
Labor force 
1975 93,775 
1985 115,461 
Employment 
1975 85,846 
1985 107,150 
Unemployment 
1975 7,929 
1985 8,312 
Unemployment 
rate 
1975 8.5 
1985 7.2 
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Year 
Fig. 1. Annual unemployment rates for the United States from 1890 to 
1986. Shaded areas represent periods of eco~lomic recessions; unshaded 
areas represent periods of general economic prosperih (12). 
barely positive, and the ranks of the unemployed have swelled. 
Canada and Australia have been able to provide more jobs but not at 
a sufficient pace to keep their unemployment rates from significantly 
increasing. Even Japan and Sweden have sustained increases in 
unemployment, but their rates still remain below what would be 
considered full employment in other countries. 
Although the U.S. economy has generated an enormous number 
of jobs since 1975, it has not been able to create sufficient 
employment opportunities to keep the unemployment rate from 
drifting upward during periods of general prosperity (Fig. 1). 
Before World War 11, the U.S. economy was subject to roller 
coaster-like swings in its unemployment experience. But with the 
advent and application of macroeconomic policies (that is, fiscal and 
monetary policies) since World War 11, the wild gyrations in the 
U.S. economy have been modulated. On the other hand, the gradual 
upward creep in the unemployment rate since 1950 (shown by the 
trend line in Fig. 1) indicates that the U.S. economy is confronted 
with increasing labor force adjustment difficulties. Because the labor 
force is not homogeneous, the composition of its growth is crucial 
to understanding the challenges to adjustment and to formulating 
the human resource policies needed to ease adjustment. 
Explanations for U.S. Labor Force Growth 
'Three major forces have contributed to the rapid growth of the 
U.S. labor force ~ \ ~ e r  the past decade. Each of these pressures has 
also exerted significant influences on the gender, age, and ethnic 
composition of the labor force. The forces are the unprecedented 
number of women who have sought e n t n  into the labor market, the 
maturing of the post-World War I1 "baby boom" population 
cohort, and the acceleration in the number of immigrants coming to 
the United States. All of these factors are likely in val?ing degrees to 
continue to exert considerable influence into the 1990s. 
Female wovkevs. More women in both absolute and relative terms 
have been entering and staying longer in the labor force than at an!l 
previous time in the nation's history. The movement has been so 
abrupt and so large that it can be fairly described as being a "social 
revolution" in its own right. Two out of even three new labor 
market entrants since 1975 have been women, and the same pattern 
is forecast to continue through 1995. The labor force participation 
rate of all \\?omen has risen sharply from 33.9% in 1950 to 54.4% in 
1986. In total, women constituted about 45% of the civilian labor 
force in 1986, and it is projected that this percentage will increase to 
47% by 1995. 
The contributing factors for this growth rest with the rapidl!? 
increasing participation rate of married women in general and 
married women with children in particular. It is the labor market 
behavior of the latter female workers that represents the dramatic 
departure from the past. Single adult women usuallv were in the 
labor market. but married women and women with children were 
not. The participation rate of married women has risen from 23.8 to 
54.7% from 1950 to 1986. The rate for women (married or not) 
with children under 18 years of age has grown from 45.9% in 1975 
to 54.7% in 1986. For women with children under 3 years of age it 
has increased from 34.1 to 50.8% over this same span. Under these 
circumstances of rapid change in social behavior, no one can predict 
what the normal labor force participation rate for women will be. It 
is projected, however, that the female labor force participation rate 
will continue to increase into the mid-1990s (4). 
The reasons for the sudden acceleration of women in the labor 
market are still the subject of debate. The movement was completely 
unpredicted by demographers and labor market forecasters. The 
mechanization of housekeeping tasks since the end of World War I1 
combined with the growing acceptance of family planning and the 
availability of new methods to permit the timing of birth occur- 
rences created an opportunity for the social change to occur. The 
momentum to alter the status of women in the workplace was 
provided in the 1960s by the civil rights movement. Women were 
not initiallv included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but as the result 
of an amedrnent. ~rohibitions a&inst sex discrimination in em- 
" 
ployment were included in the final legislation. The moral force of 
the law, combined with the creation of a legal enforcement mecha- 
nism, provided the emerging feminist movement with a lever to 
attack barriers that had previously prevented women from fully 
participating in the labor market. The momentum for change was 
subsequently prodded by the prolonged period of inflation that 
occurred during. the 1970s and earlv 1980s. The decrease in real 
" 
family Incomes forced many women to find jobs in order to 
maintain their fam~lv's previous standards of living. In the wake of 
these occurrences, there has also been a surge in the number of 
female heads of households. In 1985, 16.2% of all families were so 
constituted-up from 10.8% in 1970. For black families, the 
percentages increased from 28.3% in 1970 to 43.7% in 1985. Aside 
from single adult women, widowhood, divorce, and pregnancies 
outside of marriage have caused an increasing number of other 
women to be the sole breadwinners for their families; many such 
women have been forced to seek employment whether they wished 
to or not. 
An important population corollary to the growth of female 
participation in the labor market is the decline in family size. The 
number of children per family in the United States has fallen from 
3.2 in 1930 to about 1.8 in the mid-1980s. A sustained rate of 2.1 
children per family is needed for population replacement. The most 
significant encouragement to smaller families has been provided by 
the advance of married women into the labor force. In the future, it 
is highlv unlikel\~ that women will abandon the financial and 
independence that they have come to esperience. This is 
especially the case since divorce has become so conlmon (about half 
of all marriages will end in divorce given current averages). Thus, 
high labor force participation by women is likely to be a permanent 
feature ofthe U.S. economy as will be the pattern of smaller families. 
One consequence of these family trends has been that the number 
of new labor force entrants who are native born has been declining 
in the 1980s and will continue to do so until the mid-1990s. But, as 
opposed to other industrialized nations where similar declines in 
A L 
family size have occurred, the grov\ith in the labor force of the 
United States 1s likely to be only marginally influenced, if at all. 
Immigration of ii~reign-born persons \\rill probably serve as a 
substantial offset. Moreo\,er, the "baby boom" generation is having 
an echo effect. Because of their large numbers, the members of this 
age group are producing a large number of ch~ldren even though 
individual family sizes are shrinking. Between 1980 and 1986, the 
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number of children under age 5 increased by 10.9% (to 18,128,000 
children in 1986). I t  is the only age cohort under 24 years of age to 
show a positive rate of increase over this period. Hence, by the late 
1990s the predicted decline in native-born labor force entrants 
should be reversed. 
The matun'ng ofthe population. The rapid growth of the labor force 
has also been significantlv affected bv the age distribution of the 
U.S. popu~ationT It currently contains a large "bulge" in the age 
range between 25 and 44 years of age. Not only is it the largest 
cohort of the population, but it is also the most rapidly growing. 
The bulge is a direct result of the labor force entry of the post- 
World War I1 baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) 
who have now matured into prime working-age adults. Of the 
nation's population in 1986 of 241,596,000 people, a total of 
76,127,000 were in this age cohort (or 31.5% of the total popula- 
tion). If this cohort is broken into its two component parts, the age 
25 to 34 grouping totals 42,984,000 persons (it grew by 15.4% 
between 1980 and 1986), while the age 35 to 44 grouping contains 
33,143,000 people (it grew by 29.0% between 1980 and 1986). 
Regardless of gender or race, persons in the 25 to 44 years of age 
cohort of the population have the highest labor force participation 
rates of the entire labor force. If ever a person is going to seek work, 
it is most probable he or she will do so between these ages. Fovtune 
magazine has dubbed this population distribution of the 1980s as 
being "demography's glad tihingsX for the economy because it 
affords the U.S. economy the potential for a significant productivity 
bonus (5). Thus, the bulge is a "good" problem to be confronted 
with--es~eciall\l when its im~lications are compared to the earlier 
time when this age group was in its youth (before 1980) or what lies 
ahead when this cohort enters its retirement phase (after 2001). 
In this regard, one should note that the racial and ethnic 
composition of the "baby boom" population is also affecting the 
compositioll of the labor force. Although family size is decreasing 
for all major racial and ethnic groups, the decline began earlier and 
has been more r a ~ i d  for non-Himanic whites than for blacks and 
Hispanics. As a consequence, the proportion of the labor force that 
is black has risen from 9.9% in 1975 to 10.7% in 1985, and the 
proportion that is Hispanic has grown from 5.3% in 1980 to 6.7% 
in 1985. The labor force growth rate of both groups has been 
increasing annually since 1980 at a faster rate than that of the overall 
labor force (6). Together, blacks and Hispanics accounted for 40% 
of the absolute growth in the labor force between 1980 and 1985. 
" 
Data for other minority groups, such as Asians, are not collected on 
a monthlv and annual basis, but their numbers are also growing 
rapidly. Thus, minority workers are becoming a larger proportion of 
the labor force each year, and they will continue to do so for the 
remainder of this centurv. 
The new wave of immigvants. The last factor contributing to the 
rapid growth of the U.S. labor force is a phenomenon unique to the 
experience of the U.S. economv. It is immigration. Since the mid- 
1960s, immigration has slowly reemerged as a key characteristic of 
the U.S. population and labor force (7). In contrast to all other 
advanced industrial nations, the United States stands virtually alone 
in its willingness to admit each year hundreds of thousands of legal 
immigrantsVand refugees for permanent settlement as well as-to 
tolerate mass abuse of its laws by an even larger annual number of 
illegal immigrants, Indeed, a 1986 study of contemporary American 
society commissioned by three large U.S. corporations and conduct- 
ed by an international team of scholars proclaimed that "America's 
biggest import is people" (8, p. 20). Its detailed analysis, which 
generally documents "the decline in American exceptionalism," 
stated that the one feature to distinguish the current U.S. economy 
from those of other industrialized nations is that "immigration 
continues to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in the world"8, p. 
20). This observation, as significant as it is, was made before the 
passage of the immigration reform act of 1986 whose liberal 
amnesty provisions will guarantee that immigration levels for at least 
the next decade will soar to heights never before imagined. More- 
over, it remains to be demonstrated whether the newr law will have 
any real effect on reducing the flow of illegal immigration-the 
primary rationale for its enactment. The absence of an effective 
identification svstem, concern o\7er inadequate funding for enforce- 
ment, and the omission of any attention to the powerful "push" 
forces of population growth, poverty, unemployment, and corrup- 
tion in the countries of origin of the illegal immigrants all suggest 
that illegal immigration will continue at high and, possibly, increas- 
ing levels. 
As for the other industrialized nations, Japan accepts no immi- 
grants and few refugees. In Western Europe, the major industrial- 
ized countries pursued temporary foreign worker policies in lieu of 
seeking permanent immigrants to meet labor shortages in the post- 
World War I1 era. Since 1973, however, even these "guesnvorker" 
policies have largely been abandoned, and little, if any, encourage- 
ment is now given for new immigrants. Most of these nations have 
also taken much stronger steps in the 1980s than the United States 
to discourage illegal immigration and to reduce refugee admissions. 
With stagnant or declining labor forces, they have elected to restrict 
entry and focus policy attention on the qualitative aspects of human 
resource development for their citizens. 
The 1980 census revealed that the size of the foreign-born 
population of the United States had not only reversed its 50-year 
downward decline but had sustained a quantum increase. As a 
group, the reported foreign-born population rose from 9.6 million 
in 1970 to 13.9 million persons in 1980 (an increase of 45%). No 
other grouping of the personal characteristics of the population 
increased by a larger percentage than that of the foreign born 
between 1970 and 1980. The 1980 census also disclosed that one of 
every ten people in the country spoke a language other than English 
at home. As it is certain there was a substantial statistical undercount 
of the illegal immigrant population by the 1980 census, even these 
official findings were surely understated. Given the momentous 
immigration developments since 1980, the foreign-born population 
to be recorded bv the 1990 census will show another quantum leap. 
For this reason, the demographer Leon Bouvier has observed that 
"immigration now appears to be almost as important as fertility 
insofar as U.S. population growth is concerned" (9, p. 1) .  Since 
populatio~l changes are transmitted to the nation's economy 
through labor force changes, Bouvier warned that "there is a 
compelling argument for close coordination between the formula- 
tion of emplovment and immigration policy" (9, p. 23). So far, his 
pleas have gone unheeded. 
Immigration is also contributing to dramatic changes in the racial 
and ethnic composition of the U.S. population and labor force. 
About 85% of the legal immigrants and refugees admitted to the 
United States since the mid-1970s have come from either Latin 
America or Asia. Over this period, the six countries of origin that 
account for the largest numbers of the new legal immigrants and 
refugees are Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, China- 
Taiwan, and Cuba. The last time a European country appeared as a 
major source of new immigrants was in 1973 when Italy ranked 
fifth. Moreover, it is undebatable that most illegal immigrants to the 
United States over this same time span have also come from Latin 
America and Asia. Many illegal immigrants from these countries will 
be the beneficiaries of the new amnesty programs. Thus, both the 
population and the labor force of the United States are becoming 
more pluralistic in their ethnic and racial composition than ever 
before. 
Immigration is the one aspect of labor force growth that public 
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policy should be able to control, but to date it has not been willing 
to do so. The design of immigration policy, in all of its forms, is stii 
dominated by the pursuit of purely political objectives, and it has yet 
to be held accountable for its sizable economic consequences. Less 
than 5% of the immigrants and refugees who are legally admitted to 
the United States each year are admitted on the basis that the skills 
and education they possess are actually in demand by U.S. employ- 
ers. The percentage is considerably less than 1% if illegal immigrants 
are included in the total immigrant flow. 
The overall picture. As a result of the aforementioned develop- 
ments, the overall labor force participation for the U.S. population 
reached an all-time high of 65.3% in 1986. The comparable rate for 
1950 was 59.7%; for 1960,60.0%; for 1970,61.0%; and for 1980, 
64.1%. 
Never in the country's history have so many persons-in both 
percentage and absolute terms-sought to work. It is likely that 
both figures will continue to rise for the above-discussed reasons in 
the decade ahead. As a consequence, the economy of the United 
States will continue to be under relentless pressure to create 
sufficient job opportunities for the burgeoning number of job 
seekers. 
The Worrisome Exception 
There is, however, one disturbing countertrend buried in the 
euphoria over the rising labor force participation rate of the overall 
U.S. population. It has been the persistently lower labor force 
participation rate of black males relative to white males. Historically 
through the 1940s, the black male labor force participation rate 
consistently exceeded that of white males. But since the 1950s, the 
white male rate has passed the black rate and the gap between the 
two has widened considerably. By 1986, the white male rate 
exceeded the black male rate by 5.7 percentage points (76.9 to 
71.2%). The wide gap exists for every age grouping. Indicative of 
the significance of this decline in black male participation is the fact 
that the absolute number of black men in the labor force just barely 
exceeds that of black women (6.3 million black males to 6.2 million 
black females in the labor force in 1986). 
On the surface, there seems to be no reason why white males 
should have a significantly higher participation rate for even age 
cohort than black males or that white males should have a considera- 
bly higher overall rate. However, blacks are clustered disproportion- 
ately in the inner cities of 12 major cities and are scattered 
throughout the large geographic area of the rural South. Jobs in 
these locations are frequently scarce. But jobs are especially hard to 
find if one has few skills and little education and if there are limited 
opportunities to acquire skills or to develop latent abilities. Qualify- 
ing for the jobs is made more difficult if there are lingering practices 
of racial discrimination. It is also likely that the new wave of 
immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, who have also dispropor- 
tionately settled in inner city areas, has increased the competition for 
jobs at the entry level. Under these conditions, an inordinate 
number of black males apparently have despaired from seeking work 
in the regular economy. 
There is, of course, an ominous societal implication to these low 
black male participation rates. If adult black males are not at work, 
or in school, or in the military, what are they doing to sunlive? It 
seems that an urban subclass of adult black male'who function 
outside the normal labor market has formed and institutionalized its 
existence through irregular activities such as crime, alcoholism, and 
drug addiction. Helping those black male adults who can be 
reattracted into the regular labor market and preventing many black 
male youths from succumbing to a similar fate are major policy 
challenges of contemporary times. 
Final Thoughts 
The conti~luing growth of the civilian labor force has placed the 
U.S. economy under severe strain to provide a sufficient number of 
jobs for those who seek them. Moreover, matching job seekers with 
available jobs is not automatic. The rapidly changing composition of 
the civilian labor force has complicated the matching process. It is 
anticipated that 80% of the labor force entrants for the remainder of 
this century will be composed of women, minorities, and irnrni- 
grants (10). For historical and institutional reasons, members of 
these groups have usually had difficulty securing the necessary job 
preparation and receiving fair opportunities to compete for the 
available jobs. Hence, these changes in the size and composition of 
the labor force dictate that qualitative human resource policies- 
such as education, training, retraining, labor information, and labor 
mobility programs-become integral components of national eco- 
nomic policy. The traditional reliance on fiscal and monetary 
policies that focus only on the demand for labor are unlikely to 
ensure satisfactory labor force adjustment. Human resource policies 
specifically designed to enhance the job qualifications of the emerg- 
ing supply of labor will be more necessary than ever before. If such 
policy endeavors are undertaken on an enlarged scale from what 
currently exists and if they are combined with rigid enforcement of 
the nation's equal employment opportunity and immigration laws, 
the prospects for full employment, general prosperity, and domestic 
tranquility are good. If such steps are not taken and ~f human 
resource policies are not given high and immediate priority, the 
logical consequences are reason for concern and, possibly, alarm. 
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